Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 71
Issue 4 Winter

Article 6

Winter 1980

Securities Exchange Act of 1934--Restrictive
Applications of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
Securities Fraud
George V. Strong

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
George V. Strong, Securities Exchange Act of 1934--Restrictive Applications of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in Securities Fraud, 71 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 474 (1980)

This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

0091-4169/80/7104-0474S02.00/0

Vol. 71, No. 4
Prntedin U.S.A.

THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOCY

Copyright © 1980 by Northwestern University School of Law

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-RESTRICTIVE APPLICATIONS OF
SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 IN SECURITIES FRAUD
United States v. Chiarella, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).

I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court again plunged into the
thicket of the federal securities laws in its 1979
Term, and emerged with another restrictive interpretation' of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5. In United States
v. Chiarella,4 the Court overturned the conviction
of a financial printer who had used confidential
information obtained from his job to make profits
I In recent years, the Court has limited the coverage of
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 both
procedurally and substantively. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (negligence not sufficient
grounds for cause of action under Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only
purchasers or sellers of securities may bring a private
action under Rule 10b-5).
2 Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
3 Securities and Exchange Commision Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person ... in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
4 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980).

for himself in the securities market. In taking a
narrow approach to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
the Court ignored the broad language of these
antifraud provisions, disregarded the legislative
and administrative purposes behind them, and
broke away from administrative and judicial precedents in defining their coverage. In addition, the
Court's analysis of the exceptions to the securities
laws' general policy of full disclosure failed to
distinguish between nondisclosure for legitimate
business reasons and nondisclosure for purely Personal gain.
Although the Court did not endorse Chiarella's
activities, its restrictive approach to section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 allowed patently fraudulent conduct to go unpunished. As the basis for -finding
that a person's silence operated as a fraud in the
purchase of securities, the Court required that the
parties to the transaction have a fiduciary or confidential relationship imposing a duty to disclose
inside information. But the Court failed to probe
the reasons behind the imposition of the duty in
those special relationships. Such an inquiry reveals
that the duty stems from one party's superior access
to inside information and the unfairness of using
that information for his benefit alone. The duty
does not depend on the label a court can pin upon
the parties' relationship.
By rejecting the superior access and unfairness
analysis of the duty question, the Court unduly
limits the coverage of the antifraud provisions. In
the absence of a special relationship, Chiarella permits one party to a securities transaction to take
advantage of confidential information solely for his
personal gain. That result contravenes the language and underlying policies of the antifraud
provisions, and bodes ill for the integrity of the
securities markets.
II. THE

CHIARELLA

CASE

Vincent Chiarella worked as a "mark-up" man
in the print room of the Pandick Press, a financial
printer in New York. In the course of his work, he
handled documents relating to corporate takeover
bids. Although the names of the participating com-
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panics appeared in code or were left out of the
documents until the final press run, Chiarella deduced their identities from the context of the materials. Armed with the knowledge of impending
tender offers, he purchased stock in the target
companies and sold it at a premium soon after the
acquiring companies publicly announced their
takeover bids. Over a period of fourteen months,
5
he made approximately thirty thousand dollars.
Two months after Chiarella executed his last
sale, the Securities and Exchange' Commission began investigating his activities. The investigation
culminated in a consent decree under which Chiarella divested himselfof his profits, returning them
to the sellers of the stock.6
Following the Commission's action, a grand jury8
7
indicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of willful
misuse of material nonpublic information in connection with the purchase and sale of securities in
9
violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. After
5 Id. at 1112. The circuit court opinion noted that
Chiarella was a knowledgeable stock trader. In each of
the five takeover cases, he derived the name of the target
company from other information in the documents, such
as price histories, par values, and the number of letters in
the mock corporate names. United States v. Chiarella,
588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978). Signs posted throughout the print shop contained this warning for employees:
"You are forbidden to use any information learned from
customer's copy, proofs, or printed jobs for your own or
anyone else's benefit." Id. at 1369.
°SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
7 He was charged with seventeen counts because he
had received seventeen letters confirming his purchases
of shares. I00 S. Ct. at 1113 n.3.
1100 S. Ct. at 1113. Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 1972-78), provides in pertinent
part:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of
this title ... or any rule or regulation thereunder
the violation of which is made unlawful or the
observance of which is required under the terms of
this title ... shall upon conviction be fined not more
than S10,000, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both ... but no person shall be subject to
imprisonment under this section for the violation of
any rule or regulation if he proves he had no
knowledge of such rule or regulation.
9
Since the promulgation of Rule lOb-5 in 1942, the
vast majority of the cases have arisen on the civil side. See
3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD § 10.3 (1977). In

United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), the court attributed this
phenomenon to early cases holding that the rule provides
an implied private right of action in favor of the injured
party to enforce the rule's sanctions. See, e.g., Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
The Supreme Court has indicated that the primary
difference between criminal and civil actions under the

0

moving unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment,
Chiarella was tried and convicted on all counts."
The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit up12
held the conviction.
The Supreme Court, in a split decision, reversed.' 3 In his opinion for the majority, Justice
Powell framed the issue as "whether a person who
learns from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is planning an attempt to secure
control of a second corporation violates section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if he
fails to disclose the impending takeover before
4
trading in the target company's securities.' The
answer to that question, the Court said, required
an examination of the language and legislative
as its interpretation
history of the statute, as well
15
by the SEC and the courts.
Finding no "specific guidance" in the language
securities laws is the burden of proof required for a
verdict. See SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943).
On the basis ofJoiner, the Charnay court concluded that
the precedents established in civil cases interpreting Rule
1Ob-5 apply to criminal prosecutions under the rule.
United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d at 348. See also United
States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1970) (opinion of
Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971); United
States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 128, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
By not questioning the applicability of the civil lob-5
cases in its opinion, the Chiarella Court assumed the
relevance of their principles in the criminal context.
Thus, criminal prosecutions and convictions are possible
whenever a Rule lOb-5 violation is willful.
For a general overview of criminal liability under the
securities laws, see Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission: An Introduction to the Enforcement of the Criminal
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 121 (1979).

" United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). Chiarella claimed that the indictment
failed to charge an offense. Id. at 96. The district court
held that his acts, if proven, operated as a fraud. Id.
" 100 S. Ct. at 1113. The district court's jury charge
permitted a conviction upon a finding that Chiarella
willfully failed to inform the sellers of target company
stock that he knew of the planned takeovers. Id.
Chiarella was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of
one year for the first thirteen counts, to be suspended
after a month's imprisonment. Imposition of sentence on
the remaining counts was suspended. In addition, he
faced a probation period of five years following his release
from prison. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1364
n.7.
12United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358.
'3100 S.Ct. at 1113. Justice Powell wrote the majority
opinion, with Justice Stevens writing a concurrence. Justice Brennan concurred in the result. ChiefJustice Burger
wrote a dissent, as did Justice Blackmun, with whom
Justice
Marshall joined.
' 4 Id. at 1112.
5
' Id. at 1113.
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and legislative history, the Court grounded its
holding mainly on its reading of the caselaw. Although the Court recognized that the administrative and judicial precedents establish that silence
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
can be a violation, "such liability is premised upon
a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.' ', 7 The Court expressly rejected the Second
Circuit's view that persons who regularly receive
material nonpublic information have an affirmative duty to disclose.' 8 Instead, the Court emphasized that the duty to disclose arises from a relationship between the parties, not from a person's
access to information because of his position in the
market.' 9 The Court found that Chiarella had no
because
duty to the sellers of target company2 stock
0
he had no prior dealings with them.
Setting forth the essence of the Court's decision,
Justice Powell stated:
Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it catches must be fraud. When an
allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there
can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold
that a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not
arise from the
mere possession of nonpublic market
2
information. '
The Court noted that it could not affirm the
conviction unless it recognized a "general duty
between all participants in market transactions to
forego actions based on material, nonpublic information." 22 The Court refused to create such a duty
without some evidence of congressional intent, noting that neither Congress nor the SEC has adopted
a "parity of information" rule. On the contrary,
the Court said, they have dealt with the problems
of misuse of market information through detailed
regulation that recognizes that the use of nonpublic
information may not always harm the securities
23
markets.
i6 id.

i7Id. at 1115.
iSId at 1116. The lower court held: "Anyone-corporate
insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic
information may not use that information to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose, he must abstain from
buying or selling." United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d
1365 (emphasis in original).
'9
100 S. Ct. at 1116 & n.14.
20
Id. at 1116-17. "He was not their agent, he was not
a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence." Id. at 1117.
2' Id. at 1118.
22
Id. at 1117.
2 Id.
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The Court declined to decide the question
whether Chiarella had breached a duty to the
acquiring corporations.2 The Court found that the
jury had received no instructions on the breach of
duty to anyone except the sellers, and the Court
could not affirm a conviction on a theory not
presented to the jury. The Court refused to "speculate on whether such a duty exists, whether it has
been breached, or whether such a breach'consti25
tutes a violation of section 10(b)."
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens said he
agreed that Chiarella owed no duty of disclosure
to the sellers, and because the conviction rested on
an incorrect theory, he concluded that the Court
properly had reversed. He stressed, however, that
the Court had not placed "any stamp of approval"
on Chiarella's actions; nor had it held that similar
26
actions must be considered lawful in the future.
Justice Brennan, also in a concurrence, agreed
with the Court that no duty to disclose arises from
the mere possession of nonpublic market information. But he disagreed that no violation could exist
absent the breach of some duty flowing from a
fiduciary relationship between buyer and seller.
Justice Brennan instead supported the Chief Justice's position that a person violates section 10(b)
whenever he improperly converts to his own benefit
nonpublic information that he uses in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. Nevertheless,
he found that the jury had received no instructions
on improper conversion.
While Chief Justice Burger accepted the general
rule that neither party to an arm's length transaction has an obligation to disclose unless they are in
a fiduciary relationship, he recognized an exception: a duty to disclose arises whenever a party
obtains an informational advantage by unlawful
means. The Chief Justice found that section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 build on this principle, with the
result that "a person who has misappropriated

Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1119. Justice Stevens observed that Chiarella
had breached a duty of silence he "unquestionably" owed
to his employer and his employer's customers. Justice
Stevens refused, however, to say whether this breach
could give rise to criminal liability under Rule 10b-5. He
noted a possible argument that the breach of duty to the
acquiring corporations worked as a fraud or deceit upon
those companies, "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." He also recognized a counter argument: Since the acquiring corporations could not recover from Chiarella because they were not purchasers
or sellers within the meaning of Blue Chip Stamps, no
actionable violation of§ 10(b) had occurred. Id. at 111920 (Stevens, J., concurring).
26 id.
27Id. at 1120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2
2
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nonpublic information has an absolute duty to
disclose that information or to refrain from trading.' ,28 And contrary to the majority's view, he
found that the jury instructions, read as a whole,
did require the jury to find that Chiarella had
obtained his advantage "by misappropriating the
property of his employer's customers."' 9
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent and joined
by Justice Marshall, agreed with the ChiefJustice's
misappropriation theory, but found it unnecessary
to rely on it. He would find Chiarella's conduct
fraudulent even if Chiarella enjoyed his employer's
approval, because his "brand of trading" lay "close
to the heart of what the securities laws are intended
to prohibit." 30 In contrast to the majority's emphasis on the lack of a fiduciary relationship, Justice
Blackmun stressed the difference in access to confidential information between Chiarella and the
rest of the market. Accordingly, he "would hold
that persons having access to confidential material
information that is not legally available to others
generally are prohibited by Rule lOb-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit their structural inforthrough trading in affected
mational advantage
31
securities.,
III. ANALYSIS: THE BASIc FRAMEWORK
The majority approached the central issue in the
case-the legal effect of Chiarella's silence-by
reviewing the language, legislative history, and
judicial and administrative interpretations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 32 As a beginning, this
approach provides a convenient framework for
analysis. The Court erred on each of these fronts.
A. LANGUAGE

The Court concluded that the language of section 10(b) offered no guide in deciding the case
because it fails to state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device.33 But such
s Id.at 1120-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief

Justice concluded:
In sum, the evidence shows beyond all doubt that
Chiarella, working literally in the shadows of the
warning signs in the print ship misappropriatedstole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted in him in the utmost confidence.
He then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by purchasing securities in the market. In
my view, such conduct plainly violates § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.
Id. at 1123.
29Id. at 1122.
30Id. at 1123 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'Id. at 1126.
32 100 S. Ct.at 1113.

33Id.

a reading simply ignores the all-inclusive wording
of the statute. gection 10(b) prohibits "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ...any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules or regulations as the
Commission may prescribe. ' 'a4 Rule lOb-5 makes
it unlawful for "any person, directly or
indirectly... [t]o employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud [or] ...[t]o engage in any act,
or would
practice, or course of business which operates
35
operate as a fraud or a deceit upon any person."
Although the statute and rule do not on their
faces specify that silence constitutes an offense,
their wording is broad enough to reach silence
when it operates as a fraud. The Supreme Court
has said that "[t]hese proscriptions, by statute and
rule, are broad and, by repeated use of the word
'any,' are obviously meant to be inclusive." 36 In
concluding that the lack of specific guidance was
no guide at all, the Court disregarded the purpose
behind the broad wording. Although its breadth
precludes specific guidance, the all-inclusive language nonetheless provides significant general
guidance. That language suggests that if Chiarella's conduct in purchasing and selling securities
worked as a fraud, it fell within the prohibitions of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
B.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Chiarellamajority also said that the legislative history of the statute offered no specific direction for the resolution of the case. The Court
further noted that when the SEC promulgated
Rule lOb-5, it said nothing of the possibility that
silence might constitute a violation of section
10(b). 37 Yet the Court's opinion failed to treat any
of the relevant legislative history; nor did it examine any of the important judicial interpretations of
the legislative intent.
The legislative history bearing directly on section
10(b) is indeed sparse. Only one specific reference
to the provision appears in the report discussing
the Senate's version of the 1934 Act.ss Still, the
U.S.C. § 78j (emphasis added). For the full text,
see note 2 supra.
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (emphasis added). For the full
text, see note 3 supra.
36Affiliated UTE Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 151 (1971). Seealso 100 S.Ct. at 1121 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
7
3 1d. at 1113.
'1 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). The
report actually discusses § 9(b) of the Senate version of
the 1934 Act, S.3420. That provision became § 10(b) in
the final version.
3' 15
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report's brief mention is significant, for it expresses
the legislature's view that it could only regulate the
securities markets effectively if the Act included
"several clear statutory provisions," such as the
present section 10(b), "reinforced by penal and
civil sanctions, aimed at those manipulative and
deceptive practices which have been demonstrated
39
to fulfill no useful function." This language indicates that Congress intended the statute to have
the flexibility to reach the sort of conduct Chiarella
engaged in, which hardly fulfilled any "useful
function."
The hearings on the 1934 Act considered only
briefly the provision that became section 10(b).
According to the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder,4 0 Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman
for the drafters, gave the "most relevant exposition" of the eventual section 10(b). Corcoran said
that the section in essence provides: "'Thou shalt
not devise any other cunning devices.'" He described it as a "catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices," noting that the "Commission
should have the authority to deal with new manip' 41
ulative devices." The Court in Hocifelder termed
Corcoran's explanation "significant" and said he
42
properly described section 10(b) as a "catch-all."
As with its analysis of the statutory language,
then, the Chiarellamajority dismissed the legislative
history of section 10(b) too cavalierly. That history
shows that the draftsmen and the Congress saw
section 10(b) as an expansive net that would enable
the SEC to capture all varieties of manipulative
and "cunning" devices. The Supreme Court has
emphasized repeatedly that Congress intended the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws to be
construed "not technically and restrictively, but
43
'
flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.
While Chiarella's specific conduct may not have
entered the contemplation of the drafters, they
sufficient breadth to
nevertheless wrote a law with
44
reach his deceptive scheme.
39 Id.

40 425 U.S. at 202.
41 Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House

Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 115 (1934).
42 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 203. See
also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) ("Indeed, from its very inception,
Section 10(b) ... [has] always been acknowledged as [a
catchall].").
43Affiliated UTE Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
at 151. See also Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
The SEC has said that Congress intended the anti-
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The inclusion of the "catch-all" antifraud pro-'
vision comports with the larger goals behind all of
5
the securities legislation during the 1930s. The
Supreme Court has recognized that a "fundamental purpose" of those laws was "to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
46
As for the 1934
ethics in the securities industry.
Act itself, the Court has noted that Congress intended the Act "principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through reg47
ulation of transactions" in the securities markets.
Similarly, the Second Circuit has said that with
the 1934 Act, Congress sought "to prevent inequitfairness in
able and unfair practices and to assure
4
securities transactions generally."
The judicial emphasis on ethical conduct and
fairness in the securities markets agrees with contemporary congressional views on the purposes of
the federal securities laws. A 1975 Conference Report, for example, observed that the basic aims of
the 1934 Act remain "salutary and unchallenged., 49 Among others, those goals are "to provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of
securities" and "to assure that dealing in securities
is fair and without undue preferences among inves50
tors."
By using confidential information to gain personal profit, Chiarella crossed the bounds of fair
dealing and propriety. The judicial interpretations
of the legislative intent, as well as Congress' own
rephrasing of the goals behind the 1934 Act, suggest that Chiarella's conduct contravened the statute's broad purpose of promoting fairness in the
exchange markets.

fraud provisions not as an exclusive specification of the
particular acts or practices constituting fraud, but rather
"to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which
undue advantage may be taken of investors and others."
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
"' In addition to the 1934 Act, that legislation included
the Securities Act of 1933, the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, the Trust Indenture Act, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.
4 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at
186. See also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775
(1979).
47 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195. The
Hochfelder Court elsewhere observed that the extensive
legislative history of the 1934 Act is "bereft of any explicit
explanation of Congress' intent." Id. at 201.
'8 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848.
'9 H.R. CONF. REp. No. 94-299, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
91-92, reprinted in [1975] U.S. COD CONG. & AD. Naws
322, 323.
50Id.
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Rule lOb-5's history is less informative than that
of section 10(b). The SEC Release announcing the
rule's adoption said simply that the new rule would
close a'loophole in the existing protections against
fraud. Whereas the previous rules had applied only
to brokers and dealers, new Rule lOb-5 would
prohibit "fraud by any person in connection with
5
the purchase of securities." ' The release does show
that the SEC originally intended Rule lOb-5 to
to reach fraudulent conduct by
have the flexibility
52
any person.
The Second Circuitss has offered slightly more
guidance with its interpretation of the rule's aims.
The "essential purpose" of Rule lOb-5, the court
has said, "is to prevent corporate insiders and their
tippees from taking advantage of the uninformed
outsiders."'' Elsewhere the Second Circuit has described the "core of Rule lOb-5" as implementing
the congressional purpose that "all investors should
have equal access to the rewards of participation
in securities transactions," for Congress intended
that "all members of the investing public should
''
be subject to identical market risks. ss The court
based
noted that Rule lOb-5 reached "inequities
'
on unequal access to knowledge. ss
The Chiarella majority ignored the broad scope
of the rule that the SEC Release suggests. The
Court also failed to take account ofjudicial interpretations of the rule's purpose. Taken together,
the release and the Second Circuit's illumination
indicate that the aims of Rule lOb-5 included the
prohibition of conduct like Chiarella's. The use of
his informational advantage plainly operated as a
fraud on the sellers of target company stock.

5'SEC Release No. 3230 (1942). See also [1942] ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

10.
The Commission hastily drafted the rule over a weekend to meet a particular situation. The Regional Administrator in'Boston told the Director of the Trading and
Exchange Division that the president of a local corporation was falsely telling other shareholders that the company was performing poorly, inducing them to sell. The
president would then purchase their stock as the price
fell. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton
Freeman).
5
2See Affiliated UTE Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. at 151.
53Because its jurisdiction includes New York City, the
home of the nation's largest securities markets, the Second
Circuit has decided the lion's share of the cases involving
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
54Radiation Dynamics v. Goldmutz, 464 F.2d 876,
890 (2d Cir. 1972).
"5SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 851-52.
w Id.

C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS

The Duty Question Under Section 10(b)

Having dismissed the language and legislative
history of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 as unenlightening, the ChiarellaCourt turned to an examination of administrative and judicial interpretations of those provisions. The Court conceded that
the cases establish that silence in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security may operate as a
fraud within the meaning of section 10(b).57 But
the Court also found that liability for silence is
premised upon a relationship of trust or confidence
between the parties to a transaction.58 Specifically,
the Court pointed to corporate "insiders ' 59 and
their "tippees" ° as having the duty to disclose
because of their special relationship or constructive 61 special relationship to the other party. Finding that Chiarella occupied no such relationship
with the sellers of target company stock, the Court
concluded that he had no duty to disclose the secret
62
information he had learned.
The majority correctly pinpointed the central
issue in the case as a question of duty. Chiarella
had acquired confidential information; whether he
could use that information lawfully to purchase
57

100S. Ct. at 1115 & n.12.
59 Id.
' The definition of "corporate insider" typically includes directors, officers, and controlling shareholders.
See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REcULATION 947 (4th ed. 1977). But the term is not an easy one
to define exhaustively or with precision. Professor Bromberg has noted that the definition lies not in "organization charts or other well-defined relationships." 2 A.
BROMBERO, supra note 9, § 7.4(6)(b).
The proposed Federal Securities Code has defined
"insider" as including the following:
(1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person
controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship to
the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special
significance about the issuer or the security that is
not generally available.
ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1603 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1978). Although the ChiarellaCourt indicated that
Chiarella was not an insider, he arguably fits within the
ALI's definition.
60 A "tippee" is a person who learns material, nonpublic information from a corporate insider. See Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228,
237 (2d Cir. 1974). The court there held tippees liable
under § 10(b) because they knew or should have known
of the source of certain information and also knew of its
confidential nature, thereby incurring a duty to disclose
or refrain from trading. Id.
61The Court noted the view that a tippee's obligation
flows from his role as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1115 n.12.
6Id. at 1115.
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stock without revealing his special knowledge to
the sellers depended on whether he had a duty-a
legal obligation-to disclose or to refrain from
trading. But the question of whether a duty exists
begs another inquiry: Where does the duty come
from? From its reading of the administrative and
judicial precedents, the Chiarella Court concluded
that the duty derives from a fiduciary or confidential relationship.63 That approach, however, caused
the Court to decide the case on the basis of whether
it could affix one of those labels on Chiarella's
relationship with the sellers. The Court's analysis
ignored the reasons behind the imposition of the
duty. Although the Court chose not to confront
them, those reasons do surface unmistakably in the
precedents the Court cited.
The seminal administative interpretation of section 10(b) on the issue of silence and the duty to
disclose is the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts &
Co.' The SEC laid the foundation for its analysis
by noting that corporate insiders must disclose
material facts they have learned "by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with
whom they deal and which, if known, would affect
their investment judgment."' A failure to disclose
under those circumstances plainly violates section
10(b).
The Commission emphasized, however, that the
traditional insiders-officers, directors, and controlling shareholders-were not the only individuals upon whom the obligation to disclose rests.
The Commission said that analytically, the duty
depends on two principal elements:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone and second, the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.6
The SEC noted that in weighing these elements, it
refused "to be circumscribed by fine distinctions
and rigid classifications," an apparent reference to
common law definitions of fiduciary relationships.
Rather, the Commission would use the two ele6id.

S.E.C. 907. Cady, Roberts involved a broker who
effected advantageous trades in a company's securities
for his customers on the basis of nonpublic information
he had received from one of the company's directors, who
also worked with him in the brokerage firm.
6440

r-Id. at 911.
6

6Id.

at 912.
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ments to identify persons who are in a "special
relationship with a company or privy to its internal
affairs," thereby creating special
duties in trading
6 7
the corporation's securities.
A restrictive reading of Cady, Roberts emphasizes
the "relationship" language and concludes that the
Commission merely had restated the traditional
principles on the duty to disclose. Although the
Commission professed to abandon "rigid classifications," it still returned to the idea that only a
special relationship with a company creates the
duty.6s A broader reading of the case, however,
stresses the SEC's analysis of the origin of the duty.
The duty comes from the access to confidential
information and the unfairness of using that information for one's personal gain.
Other administrative cases interpreting the antifraud provisions have analyzed the duty question
flexibly. In Blyth & Co., 69 for example, the Commission held that bond traders had violated the
antifraud provisions when they acted on confidential information conveyed to them by an employee
of the Federal Reserve Board. 70 The Commission
said that the traders, who knew the information
was "intended to be kept nonpublic," had a duty
to refrain from effecting transactions in government securities until the Board revealed the data.7'
In Blyth, the Commission found a violation even
though no special relationship existed between the
bond traders and the other parties to their transactions. They had a duty to refrain from trading
because they possessed information no other traders
had.
In Investors Management Co., 72 the Commission

specifically rejected the argument that only a recipient of inside information occupying a special
relationship with an issuer of securities or with a
corporate insider could violate the antifraud provisions. 73 Rather, the Commission held that when
a person obtains nonpublic information which he
knows originates from a corporate source, he acquires a "relationship... to that information," subjecting him to the restraints.74 The antifraud pro671Id. The Commission concluded by observing that
"[i]ntimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be
exploited." Id.
68See generally Daum & Phillips, The Implicationsof Cady,
Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939, 950 (1962).
69 43

70 Id.

71 Id.
72

S.E.C. 1037 (1969).
at 1040.

44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).

73Id. at
74 Id. at

643.
644.
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visions prohibit him from using the information to
effect transactions
in the corporation's securities for
75
his own benefit.
Blyth and Investors Management both support a
broad reading of Cady, Roberts. In the SEC's view,
the crucial inquiries in discerning a duty to disclose
center on access and unfairness. For, as the Commission has recognized, Rule lOb-5 "'is based in
policy on thejustifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors ... have7 6relatively
equal access to material information.'
The Chiarella Court, however, focused narrowly
on the the absence of a "special relationship" creating a duty to disclose.77 The majority's rigid
approach neglected the test the SEC has developed
in the Cady, Roberts line of cases for analyzing the
duty question.78 Through his work in the print
shop, Chiarella had access 79 to secret information
intended only for a corporate purpose, and he
unfairly used that information for his own benefit.
His case satisfied the SEC's criteria for the existence
of a duty.
The majority acknowledged that a failure to
disclose material nonpublic information constitutes
fraud when a duty to disclose exists.' The trial
judge instructed the jury that it could convict
Chiarella if his "alleged conduct... would have or
did have the effect of operating as a fraud upon a
seller." 81 Had the Court properly analyzed the duty
issue in terms of access and unfairness, it would
have concluded that Chiarella owed a duty to
disclose and that his failure to speak or refrain from
trading therefore operated as a fraud. Instead, the
Court reversed the conviction because it could not
call the relationship between Chiarella and the
sellers "fiduciary" or "confidential."
In accord with the administrative cases, the ju75Id.
"6Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080 (1969)
(quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848).
7100 S. Ct. at 1117.
7nThe majority did set out the test in the text of its
opinion, but it failed to apply the two-pronged analysis
directly to the facts of Chiarella.After mentioning the test,
the Court proceeded to discuss the common law principles of fiduciary duty. See 100 S. Ct. at 1114.
The precise language the SEC used was "relationship giving access." Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. The
majority in Chiarellaapparently considered "relationship"
the critical word in the phrase. But such an emphasis
needlessly obscures the important point in the case: Chiarella used his position as a printer to acquire information
that enabled him to make money unfairly.
saSee 100S. Ct. at 1115.
81
4'd. at 1119 (quoting trial record at 686).

dicial interpretations of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 have emphasized access and unfairness as
the central factors in finding a duty to disclose.
The cases generally have not turned on the existence of a special relationship, as Chiarella now
requires. Instead, they support the notion that a
person with access to inside information because of
his position, or a person who receives confidential
information from another person with such access,
must disclose or refrain from trading.
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,82 an early 10b-5
case, the court said that the duty of disclosure
stems from the need to prevent corporate insiders
from using their positions to take unfair advantage
of uninformed minority stockholders8s The court
noted that the disclosure requirement attempts to
equalize the bargaining positions of the parties.8s
Even though Speed spoke in terms of corporate
insiders, the rationale applies with equal force to
situations like that in Chiarella.When a person is in
a position that allows him to learn information not
available to the rest of the investing public, fairness
dictates that he disclose that information or forego
his advantage. For the purpose of identifying a
duty of disclosure, the positions of Chiarella and
the corporate insider are analytically indistinguishable. Both provide access to information denied to
other investors.
Chiarella relied on Frigitempv. FinancialDynamics
Fund, Inc.s5 to establish that the party charged with
failing to disclose information must be under a
duty to do so.s While Frigitemp does support that
proposition, the Chiarellamajority failed to discuss
a more significant aspect of the case. In Frigitemp,
the court had found no duty to disclose on the
ground that the party allegedly owing the duty
correctly assumed that the other party had access
to the relevant information and could easily retrieve it with its own efforts.8 7 With that finding,
the court implied that a critical question in deter99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
SaId. at 829. The court said that one of the primary
purposes of the 1934 Act was "to outlaw the use of inside
information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial advantage to the detriment
4 of public security holders." Id.
8

8

id.

"5524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975).
86Id. at 282; 100 S.Ct. at 1115.
87 Frigitemp v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F.2d at 282. The issue in the case was whether the Fund
violated Rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose to Frigitemp its
purchases of Frigitemp shares. The court noted that
Frigitemp could learn the information from its own stock
transfer sheets. Id. at 283.
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mining the existence of the duty is whether one
party to a transaction has a means of obtaining
information unavailable to the other party.
Chiarella recognized that courts have found section 10(b) to bar "tippees" of corporate insiders
from trading on information they know is confidential.as The Court took note of the theory that
the tippee's obligation rests on his role as a participant after the fact in a corporate insider's breach
of fiduciary duty.'s While that theory places the
tippee cases in the Court's fiduciary duty pigeonhole, it amounts to little more than a fiction. The
tippee occupies no fiduciary relationship with the
corporation or its shareholders; he does not acquire
the confidential information because of his position
in the company. Rather, he stands as the passive
recipient of corporate secrets, which he then employs for his personal gain. The "participant after
the fact" theory merely obfuscates the true reason
for imposing liability on tippees. The tippee may
not profit from the confidential information because he had an access not open to the general
investing public.90
For the purpose of analyzing the duty to disclose,
Chiarella is no different from a tippee. He stands
in no fiduciary relationship with the acquiring
corporation, the target corporation, or the target's
shareholders. In particular, his relationship with
the acquiring corporation is at least as removed as
the tippee's relationship to the company that his
9
confidential information concerns. The argument l
that Chiarella breached a fiduciary duty flowing
from his attenuated relationship with the tender
offeror indulges in a fiction similar to the "participant after the fact" theory of tippee liability. Both

88 100 S. Ct. at 1115 n.12 (citing Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d at 237-38).
89 100 S. Ct. at 1115 n.12 (citing [1974] Sec. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 233, at D-1, D-2). See also Fleischer,
Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798,
818 n.76 (1973).
saSee Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). There, the court relied on an access test
to hold liable under Rule lOb-5 the brother and two
friends of the president of a closely held corporation for
failing to disclose confidential information about the
company's future plans when they purchased stock from
minority shareholders.
9i The Chiarella Court noted the possibility that a
conviction under § 10(b) could rest on the theory that
Chiarella breached a duty to the acquiring corporation.
But the Court expressed no opinion on this theory, because it had not been presented to thejury. 100 S. Ct. at
1118. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
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of those approaches gloss over the issues of access
and unfairness, which are the analytic underpinnings of the duty. The stark fact remains that
Chiarella, like the tippee, had superior access to
information in comparison with other investors,
and the unfairness of using the information should
bar his trading.9
Some courts have described the duty to disclose
in the broadest possible language, reaching beyond
the position of access test. For example, in SEC v.
9
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 3 the court said in dicta that
"anyone in possession of material inside information
must either disclose it to the investing public" or
abstain from trading if he would violate a corporate
94
confidence by disclosing. The court justified its
position by explaining that the policy behind Rule
lOb-5 is to ensure that all investors have95 "relatively
equal access" to material information.
Despite the language and the reasoning of the
cases supporting a duty to disclose based upon
superior access to inside information, the Chiarella
Court clung to the notion that a non-insider with
no fiduciary relationship to a seller has no obligation to disclose material facts.9o Some cases do
provide support for this proposition. In Kohler v.
97
Kohler Co., the court said that the intent of section
10(b) was to create a fiduciary relationship between
corporate "insiders" and the "outsiders" with
98
whom they deal in the corporation's securities. In
SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc.,9o the court
noted that a reading of Rule lOb-5 that would
place an affirmative duty of disclosure on persons
' In a sense, Chiarella's behavior is even more reprehensible than that of the tippee. Chiarella took positive
steps to uncover the secret information, whereas a tippee
might receive such information without any of his own
effort.
93401 F.2d 833.
' Id. at 848 (emphasis added). See also Lewelling v.
First California Co., 564 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Rule lOb-5 requires that "those in possession of material
information which is not generally available to the other
party disclose before selling, or refrain from dealing.");
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495
F.2d at 236 (quoting the language from Texas GulfSulphur
with approval).
'5SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. The
court went on the describe the "essence" of the rule in
the language of Cady, Roberts. Id. See text accompanying
note 66 supra.
96 100 S. Ct. at 1115 (citing General Time Corp. v.
Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)).
97319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
98
Id.at 637.
99407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920
(1969).
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who do not occupy a special relationship with a
seller or buyer of securities would "break new
ground and require most careful consideration. ' o
But these cases fail to look beyond the "insider" or
"fiduciary" labels to discover the reason for the
special duties that stem from the relationship. Insiders and fiduciaries must disclose because their
positions afford them a special access to information that other investors do not have.
In the only Rule 10b-5 case the Supreme Court
has decided relevant to the issues in Chiarella, the
Court's reasoning supports the superior access theory more than it does the fiduciary relationship
approach. In Affiliated UTE Citizens v. United
States,01 a group of American Indians formed a
corporation to distribute the tribal assets among its
mixed blood and full blood members. The corporation issued stock and appointed a Utah bank as
transfer agent. Upon learning that two of the
bank's employees had encouraged the sales of Indian shares to non-Indians at prices well below
their price on an all non-Indian market, several
former shareholders brought suit. They alleged
that the bank and its employees had violated section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by failing to inform
them of the higher prices prevailing on the nonIndian market.
The Court noted that had the bank functioned
"merely as a transfer agent, there would have been
no duty of disclosure."' 1 2 The Court found, however, that a duty to disclose did exist because the
bank had acknowledged its responsibilities to insure that transfers were properly made and to act
for individual shareholders in the sale of their
stock. °3 The Court said that the bank employees
could not remain silent while facilitating sales from
mixed bloods to persons seeking to profit on the
non-Indian market, with which the bank employees were fully familiar. °4 Accordingly, the Court
held that the defendants' activities in inducing the
mixed bloods to sell without informing them of the
other market operated as a fraud in violation of
Rule l0b-5.' O
The Chiarella majority read Affiliated UTE to
support its position that no duty of disclosure arises
absent a fiduciary or insider relationship. 1 6 Presumably the Chiarella Court believed that by un'00 Id. at 460.
'0'406 U.S. 128.
'02 Id. at 152.
103 id.
104Id. at 153.
105Id.
1

06See 100 S. Ct. at 1115.

dertaking to act in behalf of the Indians in their
transfers and sales, rather than "merely as transfer
agent," the bank had assumed a fiduciary duty
that gave rise to a duty to disclose. This reading,
however, again substitutes the "special relationship" label for hard analysis. The Court in Affiliated
UTE found a duty to disclose not simply because
of the bank's undertaking, but more importantly,
because of the bank's knowledge of the non-Indian
market. Like Chiarella, the bank failed to disclose
information it knew would affect the Indian shareholders' decision to sell. The duty arose from the
bank's superior access to information about the
non-Indian market; its pivotal position in transactions from one market to the other gave it a perspective unavailable to the Indian investors. Contrary to the majority's understanding, then, Affiliated UTE suggests that "a structural disparity in
access to material information is a critical factor
under Rule 10b-5 in establishing a duty either to
disclose
the information or to abstain from trad10 7
ing.)
The Duty Question at Common Law
The majority in Chiarellarelated to common law
fraud principles its position that only a special
relationship can create the duty to disclosesen An
examination of those principles, however, leads to
the same conclusion as the analysis of the duty
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The duty
derives from a party's superior access to material
information.
Dean Prosser has said that, as a general rule,
neither party to an arm's length business transaction has an obligation to disclose information to
the other unless the parties stand in a fiduciary or
confidential relationship.' °9 He noted that the rule
of nondisclosure properly applies when the parties
have equal opportunities for obtaining information.110 Thus a person may sell his house without
telling the buyer that it has termites, because the
buyer theoretically has the opportunity to inspect
the house before he purchases it."'
107Id. at 1126 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108
See 100 S.Ct. at 1114 & n.9.
109W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (4th ed.
1971). See also James & Gray, Misrepresentation-PartII,
37 MD. L. REv. 488, 523 (1978). This general rule, a
correlative of the doctrine of caveat emptor ("let the buyer
beware"), reflects an individualistic philosophy based on
freedom of contract. Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Nondisclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 31 (1936).
no W. PROSSER, supra note 109, § 106.
' See Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass.
667, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942).
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Prosser observed an "amorphous tendency" by
most courts to find a duty of disclosure where a
defendant-seller has special knowledge or means of
knowledge not open to a plaintiff-buyer and knows2
that the buyer misunderstands material facts."
Even the old "termite cases" have undergone reconsideration." 3 He did not, however, see any corresponding tendency in cases where the buyer has
the special information, as courts generally allow
a buyer to reap the benefits of his diligence and
acumen in discovering facts." 4 Yet he noted that
the law is working toward the conclusion that full
disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever "elementary fair conduct" so demands.' 15 The6
Second Restatement of Torts supports this view.
The common law doctrines on the duty to disclose suggest several points relevant to Chiarella.
First, the general rule of nondisclosure absent a
fiduciary relationship is based on the premise that
the parties have equal opportunities to learn material facts. In Chiarella,the sellers did not have the
same opportunity Chiarella had to discover the
tender offers. Second, even if the law continues to
impose no duty to disclose on the buyer, that rule
should apply only where the buyer has acquired
the special knowledge through honest efforts and
superior skill." 7 Chiarella, in the words of the Chief
12w.

PROSSER,

supra note 109, § 106. See, e.g., Strong

v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Edward Malley Co. v.
Button, 77 Conn. 571, 60 A. 125 (1905).
113See, e.g., Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353
P.2d 672 (1960). See also James & Gray, supra note 109, at
526.
114W. PROSSER, supra note 109, § 106.
1s Id. See also Keeton, supra note 109, at 31. The
federal securities laws reflect this movement. As the
Supreme Court has observed, a fundamental purpose of
the securities laws was "to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor." SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186. See text
accompanying note 46 supra.
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977),
which provides:
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the
other before the transaction is consummated,
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that
the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as
to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a
disclosure of those facts.
117See Keeton, supra note 109, at 25:
It seems that the way in which the buyer acquires
the information which he conceals from the vendor
should be a material circumstance. The information
might have been acquired as the result of his bring-
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Justice,
"misappropriated-stole
to
put
it
bluntly-" the confidential information about the
tender offers. a Finally, the current trend toward
a general fairness rule would mandate disclosure
by Chiarella, as his silence offends most everyone's
sense of elementary fair conduct.
The Chiare/laCourt recognized that Rule l0b-5's
restrictions on insider trading grew out of the common law notion that corporate insiders owe'a duty
to disclose because of their special relationship with
other shareholders." 9 Similarly, commentators
have noted that the origin of lOb-5's prohibitions
lies in the common law special circumstances
rule. 120
The United States Supreme Court embraced the
121
special circumstances rule in Strong v. Repide. In
that case, a director purchased a minority shareholder's stock without disclosing his knowledge of
an impending sale of the company's land to the
government at a price that would greatly enhance
the value of the stock. The Court held that the
special facts of the case, including the defendant's
position as a director, his controlling interest in the
company, and his role as chief negotiator in the
land sale, created a duty to disclose his knowledge
22
of the sale.
Under the Strong special facts doctrine, the duty
arises because the corporate officer possesses special
knowledge gained from his work with the company.123 Since he has access to information unavailable to the average shareholder, he must disclose any special facts affecting the value of the
stock before he purchases from such a shareholder.
Without this disclosure, the trade would be unfair.
The Chiarella situation closely resembles that in
Strong. Chiarella's position as a financial printer
gave him access to knowledge unavailable to the
investors with whom he dealt. Fairness requires

ing superior knowledge, intelligence, skill or technical judgment; it might have been acquired by
mere chance; or it might have been acquired by
some tortious action on his part.... Any time information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem
that there should be a duty to disclose that information.
11 100 S. Ct. at 1123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
aId. at 1114 &n.10.
120Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 89, at
818.
121213 U.S. 419 (1909).
122Id. at 432. For a more recent application of the
special circumstances doctrine, see Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
2
' 3 See 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1168.2 (1975).

SECU'RITIES FRAUD

that he disclose his special knowledge before trading or, because disclosure would violate his employer's rule against revealing secrets learned at
work, that he refrain from purchasing the stock.
The identical considerations underlying the common law special circumstances doctrine give rise to
a duty in a case like Chiarella.
IV.

ANALYSIS: THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
SCHEME

The Supreme Court expressly rejected the rule
adopted by the Second Circuit in Chiarella that
"[a]nyone... who regularly receives material nonpublic information" incurs a duty to disclose. 124 By
so doing, the Court necessarily disapproved of the
broader dicta in Texas Gulf Sulphur that "anyone in
possession of material inside information" must
either disclose or refrain from trading.' The Court
refused to hold that a person owes a general duty
to the marketplace to forego transactions based on
confidential information.126 Instead the Court limited the duty to those instances where127a specific
relationship exists between two parties.
The Court's reluctance to find a duty in Chiarella
indicated its desire to restrict the coverage of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court apparently
feared that an expansive reading of these antifraud
provisions might proscribe conduct lying beyond
their intended reach. A duty to disclose based on
an access to information test would, in the Court's
view, be overinclusive. The Court emphasized that
it refused to formulate such a broad duty "absent
some explicit evidence of congressional intent."'8
In support of its position, the Court recognized
that in the overall statutory and regulatory scheme
the use of inside information may not always harm
the securities markets.'2 In particular, the Court
pointed to the Williams Act,1a° which permits a
tender offeror to purchase up to five percent of a
target company's stock before making a disclosure
of its takeover plans.' 3 ' The Court also noted the
practice of "warehousing," whereby a tender offeror discusses its plans with an institutional investor before making a public announcement to allow
124100 S. Ct. at 1116.

12 5 See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
26
1 See 100 S. Ct. at 1117.
28

I

id

'30

15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976).
100 S. Ct. at 1117 & n.15.

the institution
to acquire shares at the lower pre1 2

offer price.

1

By discussing the Williams Act and warehousing, the Court attempted to show that an access to
information rule would cause section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to cover trading on inside information
that Congress and the SEC have permitted. Ironically, however, an examination of both warehousing and pre-announcement purchases by a tender
offeror ultimately reveals a basis for limiting the
duty to disclose under an access test. The duty
arises only when a person has superior access to
information that he uses for purely personal gain.
If use of confidential information is necessary to
advance a legitimate business objective, however,
no duty should attach.
In a pre-Williams Act case, General Time Corp. v.
Talley Industries,133 a target company brought suit
against an acquiring company on the theory that
the offeror violated Rule 10b-5 by purchasing the
target company's stock without disclosing the more
favorable terms of its merger plan. The court denied the claim, noting that under the law applicable at the time, a purchaser of stock who was not
an insider and who had no fiduciary relation to a
prospective seller had no "obligation to reveal circumstances that might
raise a seller's demand and
14
thus abort the sale." 3
The Williams Act changed the rule of General
Time for acquisitions exceeding five percent of the
target's stock. But under Chiarella,the court's holding still applies to the purchases up to that level.
This approved practice of nondisclosure appears to
be at odds with the superior access and unfairness
rule.
At first glance, the parallels between Chiarella's
activities and a tender offeror's pre-disclosure purchases are striking. The tender offeror has access to
material information unavailable to the sellrs of
target company stock, for the offeror knows it will
attempt to acquire the target at a price per share
in excess of the pre-offer market price. Similarly, a
person in Chiarella's shoes knows that the price of
target company stock will rise when the tender
offer is announced. Further, the injury to the sellers
of target stock is the same. In both cases, knowledge
of the tender offer would cause them to demand
more money for their shares. Yet the positions of
the offeror and Chiarella are analytically different
for the purpose of imposing Rule lOb-5 liability.
132 Id. at 1117. See Fleiseher, Mundheim & Murphy,
supra note 89, at 811.
3 403 F.2d 159.
'3Id. at 164.
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As the ChiefJustice noted in his Chiarelladissent,
the tender offeror's secret purchases represent a
legitimate business practice.' The offeror wishes
to "test the water" before it proceeds with the full
tender offer. 136 Moreover, if the tender offer ultimately succeeds, a more efficient business entity
should emerge, presumably promoting economic
growth. 1 1 7 Chiarella, on the other hand, engaged
in no legitimate business activity. Relying on deceptive methods, he pursued financial gain for
himself alone.ss
Furthermore, as the Second Circuit noted in its
opinion in Chiarella, the offeror takes a risk that
Chiarella did not. Chiarella knew he would make
a profit when he began his trading activities. 139 But
the tender offeror, despite knowing that the price
of target securities will rise once it announces the
offer, still has "no alchemic power to transform this
knowledge into certain profit.' 40 Its initial purchases will appreciate in value only because the
market will react to the prospect of the offeror
putting up more money. When the price does go
up, the offeror, unlike Chiarella, will buy more
shares at that higher level, rather than sell the ones
it has.' 4 ' As a matter of fairness, then, the offeror's
nondisclosure is eminently more acceptable than
Chiarella's.
In addition to the Williams Act, the Chiarella
Court discussed "warehousing."' 142 The Court
deemed especially noteworthy the SEC's attempts

to proscribe this practice by special regulation. The
majority said that the Commission's proposed Rule
14e-2' 43 evinced the SEC's recognition that any
' 100 S. Ct. at 1122 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The
court in General Time observed that secrecy has long been
the "hallmark of most stock acquisition programs, at least
in their initial stages." General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, 403 F.2d at 164.
136100 S. Ct. at 1122 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
137See United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. at 97.
'38 Id. See also 100 S. Ct. at 1122 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1366-67.
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141 Id.
142

100 S. Ct. at 1117.

143Proposed SEC Rule 14e-2, SEC Release No. 34-

15548, 44 Fed. Reg. 9956, 9987-88 (1979), provided in
pertinent part:
(a) It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative act or practice within the meaning of
section 14(e) of the Act for any person, who knows
or has reason to believe that a bidder will make a
tender offer for the securities or a class of securities
of a specific subject company, and who has received
such information directly or indirectly from such
bidder, to purchase ... any security of such target
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proceeding against warehousing under section
10(b) "would rest on a 'somewhat different theory'
than that previously used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity."'" M Curiously, the Court
neglected to point out that the SEC never adopted
Rule 14e-2, having withdrawn the proposal in
December 1979.145 Moreover, in the release accompanying the proposed rule, the SEC discussed the
Chiarella litigation, but did not question the conviction or the Second Circuit's reasoning in its
affirmance.'4 s In fact, the release noted that the
proposed rule would "affirm a duty of disclosure"
for persons trading on nonpublic information 47obtained "directly or indirectly from a bidder."'
Still, when measured against the access test,
warehousing appears indistinguishable from Chiarella's trading conduct. Like Chiarella, an institutional investor has access to information unavailable to other investors when it learns that a
corporation is planning a tender offer. The institution also knows, as Chiarella did, that if it buys
target company stock at the pre-offer price, it will
make a profit upon tendering its shares. In addition, the sellers of target stock who have no knowledge of the tender offer incur the same harm in
both instances.
Yet warehousing and Chiarella's activities remain vastly different in their purposes. A tender
offeror will have valid business reasons for providing an institution with advance notice, as the SEC's
Institutional Investor Study has acknowledged. 4 8 For
example, the offeror might give notice with the
expectation that the institution will establish a
position in target company stock and tender its
entire block of shares when the offer begins, thereby
facilitating the takeover. 4 9 Alternatively, the precompany if such bidder has not made a public
announcement of its intention to make such tender
offer, unless at a reasonable time prior to any such
purchase such person makes a public announcement
by press release or otherwise disclosing the information received and its source.
'44 100 S. Ct. at 1117-18 (citing I SEC, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. xxxii (1971)).
'4 See SEC Release No. 34-16384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70326
(1979).
,46 SEC Release No. 34-15548,44 Fed. Reg. 9956, 9977
(1979). The Commission indicated that the new rule
would extend the Second Circuit's holding in Chiarellato
reach other fraudulent practices in connection with
tender offers. Id.
i47 Id. at 9978.
'48 See 5 SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT
H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2273 (1971).
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announcement notice may afford the institution an
opportunity to participate in a financing by the
acquiring corporation, also for the purpose of easing the transfer of control.' 50 Whatever the reason,
however, the offeror's purpose in providing the
inside information reaches beyond the mere monetary aggrandizement of the institutional investor.
Thus, despite the harm to the sellers of target
company stock, warehousing has valid business
purposes behind it. Chiarella, by contrast, had no
legitimate business objective with his trading.
Through his cunning scheme, he intended only to
improve his personal financial condition. The culpability of his conduct is manifest.
In its treatment of both the Williams Act and
warehousing, the Chiarella majority failed to recognize that the exceptions to the general rule
against trading on inside information apply only
to activities representing legitimate business practices. The statutory and regulatory scheme does
not permit an individual to use confidential information purely for his own gain. Indeed, the access
to information test has drawn the distinction since
its beginnings in Cady, Roberts. There, the Commission expressly found that the duty to disclose arises
when a person has access to information intended
"only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone."' 5 ' In addition, the
Senate Report on the 1934 Act implicitly recognized the difference between legitimate business
dealings and trading only for personal gain by
indicating that the antifraud protections of section
10(b) would aim at those practices "which have
1 2
been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function."' 1
A duty to disclose deriving from a person's superior access to confidential information remains
viable when it incorporates a caveat for legitimate
business practices. The Chiarella Court's concern
that such a duty sweeps too broadly thus appears
unwarranted. Properly applied, the access test for
15 Id.

Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912.
'52 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
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liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 conforms with the overall statutory and regulatory
scheme.
V.

CONCLUSION

With its decision in Chiarella,the Supreme Court
has signaled its unwillingness to give the expansive
construction that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
require to fulfill their functions as "catch-all" antifraud provisions. By requiring the existence of a
talismanic "special relationship" before it will find
a duty to disclose inside information, the Court
disregards the policies underlying the federal securities laws. The fundamental goal of fair dealing
in the securities markets requires that all traders
have equal access to information that will affect
their investment decisions. Although the ideal of
equal access must occasionally yield to legitimate
business practices necessitating informational disparity, it should never succumb when a trader
employs inside information for selfish gain. The
Court's pedantic view of the duty question leaves
room for individuals having no "special relationship" to make unfair use of inside information they
obtain by dishonest, or even fortuitous, means.
The language and legislative history of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 evince the intent of Congress
and the SEC to proscribe all varieties of fraudulent
practices in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. The administrative and judicial precedents have carried out that intent in developing a
workable standard, based on access and unfairness,
for determining when silence will operate as fraud.
That standard has sufficient flexibility to cover
whatever methods human ingenuity can design to
gather and use inside information without disclosure. The Chiarella Court now requires a recasting
of that approach in the superficial terminology of
fiduciary or confidential relationships. The Court's
narrow vision risks injury to the integrity of the
securities markets and can only bring harm to the
investing public, the intended beneficiaries of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
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